Twelve Times and Out--Application of Indiana Gross Income Tax Act of 1933 Again Declared Unconstitutional by Molloy, Robert T.
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 23 | Issue 1 Article 4
11-1-1947
Twelve Times and Out--Application of Indiana
Gross Income Tax Act of 1933 Again Declared
Unconstitutional
Robert T. Molloy
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert T. Molloy, Twelve Times and Out--Application of Indiana Gross Income Tax Act of 1933 Again Declared Unconstitutional, 23 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 54 (1947).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol23/iss1/4
TWELVE TIMES AND OUT-APPLICATION OF
INDIANA GROSS INCOME TAX ACT OF 1933
AGAIN DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The Indiana Gross Income Tax Act of 1933,' as amend-
ed,' has had an extended and not uneventful constitutional
career. Enacted in 1933 in the depths of a depression to se-
cure additional revenue to enable a measure of tax relief
extended in the preceding years I to the hard-pressed realty
interests of the state to be continued, this act has been be-
fore the United States Supreme Court on twelve occasions.
On the last of these occasions, the act, as applied to gross re-
ceipts from securities sold in interstate commerce, was again
held to be unconstitutional.' In view of this extended litiga-
tion and the broad implications flowing from this latest test
of the act's constitutional scope, a closer examination both
of the act itself and its juristic history would seem to be in
order.
The tax levied by the act is, in fact, a gross receipts tax '
and not a sales tax although applied to gross receipts from
sales. Nor is it a tax in lieu of ad valorem taxes on property
since state and local taxes upon property within the state
are not thereby reduced.' It is not a consumption tax since
no provision is made for passing the burden of this tax along
to the consumer." Neither is the tax one on occupations
since all groups are included within its scope.8
1 Chapter 50 of the Laws of 1933, now Chaper 26 of Title 64 Burns Indiana
Stat. Anno. (1943 Replacement), effective May 1, 1933.
2 Chapters 5, 117, Acts of 1937; Chapter 140, Acts of 1941; Chapter 22,
Acts of 1941; Chapters 82, 144, 282, Acts of 1943; Chapters 143, 310, Acts of
1945; Chapter 126, Acts of 1947.
8 Chapter 10, p. 17, Acts of 1932.
4 Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249 (Dec. 13, 1946), rehearing denied, 329
U. S. 832 (Jan. 13, 1947).
5 J. D. Adams Manufacturing Company v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307, 310-311
(1938).
6 Ibid.
7 Opinion of Attorney General of Indiana, Aug. 21, 1934.
8 "The Act does not impose an occupational tax but imposes a tax on the
privilege of -receiving income." Department of Treasury v. Jackson, 110 Ind.
App. 36, 37 N. E. (2d) 31, 34 (1941).
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Under this act a tax at rates varying from 1/4 of 1% to
1 % according to the source of income is levied on the receipt
of gross income of all persons resident or domiciled in Indi-
ana and upon the receipt of gross income derived from ac-
tivities or business or any other source within Indiana. The
term "gross income" is broadly interpreted by both the act 9
and the courts 1o and includes not only wages, profits and
rents but gratuities, prizes, dividends, judgments and capital
gains. The wildest possible coverage is achieved by defining
the word "person" 11 as including individuals, fiduciaries,
partnerships, associations, societies and corporations.12 The
term even includes municipal corporations and other political
subdivisions of the state engaged in private or proprietary ac-
tivities or business.'i
Exemptions from the tax are limited, the principal sums
excluded being amounts received exclusively for religious,
charitable, scientific, educational, social and civic purposes
by institutions, trusts, groups and similar bodies. 4 These
exemptions are strictly construed so that an agricultural co-
operative organized as a non-profit association under the
state's laws is not entitled as such to exemption from the
gross income tax.15 More significant constitutionally i$ the
exemption from tax of so much of a taxpayer's gross income
9 Section 64-2601 (m), Burns Indiana Stat. Anno. (1943 Replacement) (1945
Supp.).
10 The purpose of this Act was stated to be "to levy a tax on all income
and not to limit the tax to accretions flowing from invested property." De-
partment of Treasury v. Crowder, 214 Ind. 252, 15 N. E. (2d) 89, 92 (1938).
11 "The use of the term 'person' in the statute is broad and generic." De-
partment of Treasury v. Dietzen's Estate, 215 Ind. 528, 21 N. E. (2d) 137, 139
(1939).
12 Section 64-2601 (a), Burns Indiana Stat. Anno. (1943 Replacement) (1945
Supp.)
1-8 Idem. Department of Treasury v. Michigan City, 223 Ind. 432, 60 N. E.
(2d) 947 (1945); Department of Treasury v. City of Linton, 223 Ind. 363, 60 N.
E. (2d) 948 (1945); Department of Treasury v. City of Evansville, 223 Ind. 435,
60 N. E. (2d) 952 (1945); Department of Treasury v. Tipton, 223 Ind. 373, 60
N. E. (2d) 957 (1945).
14 Section 64-2606 (i), Burns Indiana Stat. Anno. (1943 Replacement) (1945
Supp.).
15 Storen v. jasper County Farm Bureau Co-Operative Ass'n. 103 Ind. App.
77, 2 N. E. (2d) 432 (1936).
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"as is derived from business conducted in commerce between
this state and other states of the United States, or between
this state and foreign countries." 16
The act as originally adopted levied taxes at just two sets
of rates, 1/4 of 1% and 1%. Provision has since been made
for a third rate, 1/2 of 1%. The 1% rate applies generally
to the gross income of public utilities, to rents, dividends,
salaries, wages, all receipts from retail sales and all gross in-
come not specifically taxable at a lower rate. The 1/2 of
1% rate applies generally to the gross income of retail mer-
chants, and of dry cleaning and laundering establishments.
The lowest rate of 1/4 of 1% is levied on gross receipts de-
rived from display advertising and wholesale sales, including
industrial processing."
The constitutionality of the original 1933 act was quite
literally challenged before the ink on the new measure was
dry. In Miles v. Department of Treasury 18 the appellant
taxpayers had sued to enjoin the paying out of state funds
for the printing of the new act on the grounds of its uncon-
stitutionality. The respondent's demurrer below had been
sustained and the taxpayer on appeal relied upon a two-fold
constitutional attack. The appellant first argued that the
tax was void because, being a property tax, the varying rate
of 1/4 of 1 % to 1 % kept the tax from being uniform as re-
quired by the state constitution. 9 The Supreme Court of
Indiana in a lengthy opinion dismissed this argument on the
grounds that the tax in question was not a property tax but
was rather "an excise, levied upon those domiciled in the
16 Section 64-2606 (a), Burns Indiana Stat. Anno. (1943 Replacement) (1945
Supp.). This section concludes with the words "but only to the extent that the
State of Indiana is prohibited from imposing a tax .. .by the Constitution of
the United States of America."
17 For full details as to the rates levied on gross income derived from various
sources see Section 64-2603, Burns Indiana Stat. Anno. (1943 Replacement) (1945
Supp.).
18 193 N. E. 855, 97 A. L. R. 1474 (1935).
19 "The General Assembly shall provide, by law, for a uniform and equal
rate of assessment and taxation. . . ." Art. 10, § 1.
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state, upon the basis of the privilege of domicile, and that
the burden may reasonably be measured by the amount of
income." 20
The second constitutional objection of the appellant was
likewise dismissed. The tax rate's varying from 1/4 of 1%
to 1%, it was urged, operated to deprive those subject to it
of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed alike by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and the language of state constitution.2 In the court's opin-
ion this argument failed because of the fact that the classi-
fication upon which the varying rates were based was reason-
able and the tax was therefore upheld.
Thereafter a rehearing was granted and a new opinion
issued superseding the original,22 in a fashion which in later
years was to become popular with the United States Supreme
Court itself.2 3 The only significant change in the new opin-
ion 24 was the correction of the former holding that the tax
was an excise levied on the privilege of domicile in Indiana.
Such a tax would, of course, violate the privileges and im-
munities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The tax
instead was held to be "an excise, levied upon those domiciled
within the state or who derived income from sources within
the state, upon the basis of the privilege of domicile or the
privilege of transacting business within the state, and that
20 Miles v. Department of Treasury, 193 N. E. 855, 861 (1935).
21 "The General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens,
privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to
all citizens." Art. 1, § 23.
22 Miles v. Department of Treasury, 209 Ind. 172, 199 N. E. 372, 101 A. L. R.
1359 (1935).
23 For what is perhaps the latest example of this slip-shod procedure spring-
ing from inadequate research and thought see Zap v. United States, 326 U. S. 777
(1945) cert. denied; Zap v. United States, 326 U. S. 802 (1946), original order
vacated and cert. granted; Zap v. United States, 328 U. S. 624 (1946) conviction
affirmed; Zap v. United States, 329 U. S. 824 (Oct. 21, 1946) rehearing denied;
Zap v. 'United States, 330 U. S. 800 (March 3, 1947) second petition for rehearing
granted and conviction reversed.
24 Note Constitutionality of Indiana Gross Income Tax Act (1936) IND. L. J.
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the burden may reasonably be measured by the amount of
income." 25
The appellants' further appeal to the United States Su-
preme Court was summarily dismissed per curiam on the
ground that "the appellants have failed to show any interest
entitling them to invoke the protection of the Federal Con-
stitution." 2
In the second case to test the constitutionality of the In-
diana Act, the taxpayer elected a sounder method of attack.
In J. D. Adams Manufacturing Company v. Storen,27 the
taxpayer contested the validity of the Indiana gross income
tax by a suit for a declaratory judgment. Here the home
offices, principal place of business and the sole manufacturing
plant of the taxpayer were located within the State of In-
diana. Over 80%, however, of its annual gross income was
derived from the sale of its products, road building machin-
ery, through selling agents or otherwise, to dealers in other
states and in foreign countries.
Reversing the Indiana Supreme Court,28 the United States
Supreme Court 21 held the tax unconstitutional. "The vice
of the statute," it was stated, "as applied to receipts from
interstate sales is that the tax includes in its measure, with-
out apportionment, receipts derived from activities in inter-
state commerce; and that the exaction is of such a character
that if lawful it may in substance be laid to the fullest extent
by states in which the goods are sold as well as those in
which they are manufactured. Interstate commerce would
thus be subjected to the risk of a double tax burden to which
intrastate commerce is not exposed, and which the com-
merce clause forbids ... The opinion of the State Supreme
25 Miles v. Department of Treasury, 209 Ind. 172, 199 N. E. 372, 379 (1935).
2 Miles v. Department of Treasury, 298 U. S. 640 (1936).
27 304 U. S. 307 (1938).
28 Storen v. J. D. Adams Manufacturing Company, 212 Ind. 343, 7 N. E. (2d)
941 (1937).
29 J. D. Adams Manufacturing Company v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307, 311-312
(1938).
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Court stresses the generality and nondiscriminatory char-
acter of the exaction, but it is settled that this will not save
the tax if it directly burdens interstate commerce."
The next assault upon the Indiana statute was com-
menced in the federal courts. In Department of Treasury v.
Wood Preserving Corporation,"0 the tax was held valid as
applied to the gross receipts received by a taxpayer selling
railroad ties in Indiana. There the ties in question were sold
to the taxpayer at an Indiana rail head and were immedi-
ately resold on the spot to a railroad customer of the tax-
payer. Upon resale the ties were immediately loaded on
waiting railway cars and removed to another state for pro-
cessing by the taxpayer as the railroad company's agent.
The application of the state tax to the gross receipts of the
sale was upheld even though no apportionment was at-
tempted. The reason for this was that the sale took place
entirely within Indiana and the tax was levied on such sales
price alone thus making apportionment unnecessary.
In the same year the application of this tax was upheld in
Department of Treasury v. Ingram-Richardson Manufactur-
ing Company;?1 There the taxpayer owned and operated an
enameling factory at Frankfort, Indiana. The transactions
from which the gross income subjected to the state income
tax was received involved the fusing of enameling with metal
parts used in the manufacture of stoves and refrigerators by
customers of the taxpayer located in Indiana and neighbor-
ing states. Orders were solicited by the taxpayer's salesmen
and upon acceptance, the metal parts to be enameled were
transported to the taxpayer's factory in its own trucks. Upon
completion of the enameling process, the finished parts were
again placed in the taxpayer's trucks and returned to their
respective owners both in Indiana and in adjoining states.
80 313 U. S. 62 (1941), rev'g Wood Preserving Corp. v. Department of Treas-
ury, 114 F. (2d) 922 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940). Accord: Department of Treasury v.
Globe-Bosse-World Furniture Corporation, 221 Ind. 201, 46 N. E. (2d) 830 (1943).
31 313 U. S. 252 (1941), rev'g Ingram-Richardson Manufacturing Company
v. Department of Treasury, 114 F (2d) 889 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940).
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The United States district and circuit courts 32 held the
application of the Indiana gross income tax to the proceeds of
the taxpayer's business unconstitutional. In their view the
income received by the taxpayer was compensation not only
for the physical act of applying enamel to metal parts but
also for the trucking and soliciting of order. These latter
services were held clearly to constitute a part of interstate
commerce in so far as out-of-state customers were involved.
The state tax, not being apportioned to the local incidents
of the manufacturing process, was held void in reliance upon
Gwin, White & Prince, Incorporated v. Henneford.'3  In the
Gwin case the Supreme Court had invalidated a gross re-
ceipts tax levied by the State of Washington on the income
of a corporation which served as the marketing agent of
local fruit growers, such fruit being sold in interstate and
foreign commerce.
On appeal by the Department of Treasury, the United
States Supreme Court reversed 3 4 the Seventh Circuit court
in reliance upon its earlier decision in the Western Live Stock
case." In the latter case a New Mexico privilege tax upon
the gross receipts of certain businesses had been upheld where
the income taxed was the advertising income of a monthly
livestock trade journal, prepared, edited, and published with-
in the state but distributed both within and without New
Mexico. The advertising in question was derived from both
local and intrastate sources as a result of solicitation by the
taxpayer.
In the Ingram-Richardson case, the Supreme Court dis-
tinguished the Gwin case on the ground that in the latter
32 Ingram-Richardson Manufacturing Company v. Department of Treasury,
114 F. (2d) 889 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940).
33 305 U. S. 434 (1939).
34 Department of Treasury v. Ingram-Richardson Manufacturing Company,
313 U. S. 252 (1941).
35 Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250 (1938). On al-
most identical facts the Indiana Gross Income Tax of 1933 was upheld in In-
diana Farmers Guide Pub. Co. v. Department of Treasury, 217 Ind. 627, 29 N. E.
(2d) 781 (1940).
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case; the taxpayer's entire income was derived from services
performed "in aid of the shipment and sale of merchandise
in" interstate and foreign commerce. In the former case,
however, the transportation of the stove and refrigeration
parts together with the solicitation of orders was in and of
the intrastate aspects of the taxpayer's business of enamel-
ing. In addition, it was held, that the burden of proving
that the transporting of the customers' goods was regarded
by the taxpayer as a separately chargeable item of service
rested on the appellee which had not sustained that burden.
These two victories for the Department were followed by
a third. Here the Indiana Supreme Court " reversed the
Circuit Court of Allen County which had declared the state
gross income tax unconstitutional as applied to the taxpayer.
The appellee was an Indiana corporation engaged in the
manufacture and sale of live stock and poultry feeds. Two
of the taxpayer's factories were located in Illinois and one
in Indiana. The gross income of the taxpayer involved in
this suit was derived from sales to customers resident in In-
diana to whom delivery was made from the Illinois plants
pursuant to orders taken in Indiana but accepted in Illinois.
In the opinion of the Indiana Supreme Court, the risk of
subjecting interstate commerce to a double burden which had
constituted the "vice" of this statute in the Adams case, 7
was non-existent here. "The state of Illinois," it was felt
"could not impose such a tax on the appellee's income from
sales in Indiana." 8
On the taxpayer's appeal to the United States Supreme
Court, the judgment below was affirmed per curiam in the
36 Department of Treasury v. Allied Mills, Inc., 220 Ind. 340, 42 N. E. (2d)
34 (1942).
37 J. D. Adams Manufacturing Company v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307, 311 (1938),
discussed supra.
81 Note 36, supra. This confidence of the Indiana Supreme Court does
greater credit to its heart than its head. Cf. Northwest Airlines Inc. v. State of
Minnesota, 322 U. S. 292, 310 (1944), where Minnesota, state of taxpayer's in-
corporation, was allowed to levy a personal property tax on the full value of
the appellant's airplanes, although such planes were already legally subject to
personal property taxes in six of the seven other states through which they flew.
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authority of McGoldrick v. Felt & Tarrant Company 89 and
Felt & Tarrant Company v. Gallagter.40 The first of these
two cases upheld the constitutionality of New York City's
sales tax on sales of merchandise to city residents whose
orders were taken within the city subject to approval of the
out-of-state vendors. Following acceptance of the orders,
the goods were sent to the city buyers through interstate
channels. In the second of these cases the Supreme Court
had upheld the constitutionality of a California use tax re-
quiring a non-resident Illinois corporation selling goods with-
in the State of California to collect the tax from the local
purchasers. Although not qualified to do business in Cali-
fornia, the vendor solicited orders for its goods within the
state through resident sales agents for whose use offices were
maintained within the state.
A multiple assault was next launched upon the Indiana
tax in the form of separate actions by four different com-
panies. The first of these suits involved a Michigan corpo-
ration engaged in the manufacture and installation of furn-
aces and heating appliances. This corporation was qualified
to do business in Indiana where it maintained sales offices
and employed agents to solicit contracts. Each of these con-
tracts provided for the installation on the customer's prem-
ises of a particular heating device in return for a stated
amount payable at the corporation's home offices in Michi-
gan. Title to the equipment remained in the installing cor-
poration until full payment had been received. A specified
portion of the entire contract price was regularly specified
in each agreement as allocable to the costs of installation.
The second suit involved an Illinois corporation engaged
in the roofing business. This taxpayer likewise was quali-
fied to do business in Indiana. Although maintaining no
39 309 U. S. 70 (1940). "In independent transactions Felt & Tarrant had
to pay a California use tax and also the New York City sales tax." Powell, Sales
and Use Taxes, Collection from Absentee Vendors (1944), 57 HARv. L. Rlv. 1086,
1090.
40 306 U. S. 62 (1939).
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place of business within the state, the roofing company reg-
ularly sent salesmen into Indiana to solicit contracts re-
quiring the application of asphalt or composition shingles to
roofs and sides of houses. The taxpayer procured the
shingles from out of state jobbers. Upon the approval of
each contract by the head office in Chicago, the corporation
sent its employees into Indiana to apply the shingles in per-
formance of the contract, payments for which were to be
made in Illinois.
The third and fourth suits involved respectively a New
Jersey and an Illinois corporation having their principal
places of business in Chicago but qualified to do business in
Indiana. The gross receipts of these two corporations
which were subjected to the Indiana gross income tax were
derived from the performance of construction contracts for
which payment was made in Chicago calling for the furnish-
ing of materials, procured outside the state, and the con-
struction of breakwaters, lighthouses and piers in Lake
Michigan within the territorial waters of Indiana.
The tax was held properly assessed against all four in
Holland Furnace Company v. Department of Treasury,41 on
the grounds that a state "has the right to apply a gross in-
come tax to business actually transacted within its borders,
notwithstanding that interstate commerce, as an incident,
may have intervened at some point in the transaction." 4 '
The taxpayers' petitions for certiorari were denied by the
Supreme Court. 48
The next case to reach the United States Supreme Court 44
involved the constitutionality of the Indiana gross income
41 133 F. (2d) 212 (C. C. A. 7th, 1943).
42 Ibid at p. 215.
43 Holland Furnace Company v. Department of Treasury of State of Indiana,
320 U. S. 746 (1943); Interstate Roofing & Stpply Company v. Department of
Treasury, 320 U. S. 746-7 (1943); Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Company et al v.
Department of Treasury, 320 U. S. 747 (1943).
44 International Harvester Company et al. v. Department of Treasury of
State of Indiana, 322 U. S. 340 (1944).
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tax as applied to a wide variety of closely related commercial
transactions all possessing some aspects of inter-state com-
merce. The taxpayers, although incorporated in other
states, were authorized to do business in Indiana. The busi-
ness in question consisted of the manufacture and sale of
farm machinery and implements. Numerous manufacturing
plants and sales branches were maintained in Indiana and
adjoining states.
The taxpayers' gross income was derived from several
classes of sales transactions which for the purposes of clarity
were designated as Classes A, C, D, and E. Class A trans-
actions consisted of sales by branches outside Indiana to
dealers and users located within the State. The orders were
solicited in Indiana by agents of the out-of-state branches
at the offices at which the order was accepted and payment
made. Without direction from the Indiana purchasers, the
goods were shipped to them from warehouses or factories
located outside the state.
The Indiana Supreme Court held that the state gross in-
come tax would not constitutionally be applied to the re-
ceipts derived from such sales since "the orders upon which
the goods were sold were accepted outside the confines of
Indiana and payment was made to branches in other
states." 11
Class C sales were made by branches located outside the
state to dealers and users residing in Indiana. The orders
were solicited in Indiana but the customers accepted delivery
at the taxpayers' Indiana factories to save time and ship-
ping charges. Class D sales were made by branches located
.45 Department of Treasury v. International Harvester Company, 221 Ind. 416,
47 N. E. (2d) 150 (1943). Under substantially similar circumstances the applica-
tion of a sales tax to interstate sales has been held unconstitutional in McLeod v. J.
E. Dilworth Company, 322 U. S. 327 (1944) while a use tax on a comparable sales
transaction has been upheld on the same day in General Trading Company v. State
Tax Commission, 322 U. S. 335 (1944). Despite complaints that the difference be-
tween the two types of taxes is a verbal rather than an economic one, the use tax
remains valid and the sales and gross income tax invalid. Cf. Freeman v. Hewit,
discussed infra.
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within the state to dealers and users residing outside the
state. These customers, however, came within the state to
accept delivery. Class E sales were made by local Indiana
branches to dealers and users residing within the state. The
goods delivered, however, all originated outside the state
and were shipped into Indiana to customers resident therein
pursuant to express contract stipulation.
The application of the Indiana gross receipts tax to all
three of these latter classes of sales, C, D and E, was up-
held by the state court on the authority of the Allied Mills
case. 4  The Indiana court in reaching this decision con-
strued the Adams case as validating a gross income tax
"levied by the buyer's state regardless of the incidental inter-
state nature of the transaction." 4 7
On the taxpayer's appeal to the United States Supreme
Court, the decision below was affirmed.4 No constitutional
difference was held to exist between receipts derived from
Class C sales and the receipts from the sales held taxable
in the Wood Preserving case.49 Class D sales, it was held,
would be subject to a state sales tax 50 and so were equally
subject to a state gross income tax. And finally receipts
from Class E sales were held taxable on the authority of the
Allied Mills case. 1
40 Department of Treasury v. Allied Mills, Inc., 220 Ind. 340, 42 N. E. (2d)
34 (1942), aff'd Allied Mills, Inc. v. Department of Treasury, 318 U.S. 740 (1943),
discussed supra.
47 This interpretation of the Indiana Supreme Court would scarcely appear
to have been warranted although repeated in Hewit v. Freeman, 221 Ind. 675, 51
N. E. (2d) 6, 8 (1943); reversed Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249 (1946). Cf.
McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Company, 322 U. S. 324 (1944), Note 45, supra. The
technical type of tax, i. e., sales or use appears to be the touchstone to determine
constitutionality rather than the multiplication of any basic economic burden im-
posed in interstate commerce. "Many States, for instance impose taxes on the
consumption of goods and such taxes have been sustained regardless of the extra-
State origin of the goods, or whether a tax on their sale had been imposed by the
seller State." Freeman v. Hewit, supra.
48 LInternational Harvester Company et al. v. Department of Treasury, 322
U. S. 340 (1944).
49 Department of Treasury v. Wood Preserving Corp., 313 U. S. 62 (1941).
50 McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Company, 309 U. S. 33 (1940).
51 Note 46, supra.
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Even the limited victory won by the taxpayer with respect
to Class A sales in the International Harvester case was not
repeated in the next case involving the Indiana gross income
tax to come before the United States Supreme court. In
Ford Motor Company v. Department of Treasury,52 the
high court by adopting the well known ruse of giving the
taxpayer's counsel a lesson in procedure was enabled to avoid
the merits of the case entirely.
The Ford Motor Company, a non-resident corporation,
had originally sued in federal district court to recover sums
paid to the Department of Treasury under the Indiana gross
income tax laws. Objection was made to the imposition of
this tax on the gross receipts derived from sales where cars
were shipped directly from the taxpayer's factory in Mich-
igan or assembly plants in Illinois, Ohio or Kentucky to In-
diana dealers. The cars were paid for in cash or finance
paper by the dealers upon delivery by truck-away or convoy
companies at their places of business in Indiana.
Upon payment of the tax under protest, the corporation
sued in the local federal district court in Indianapolis to re-
cover the sums thus collected. Recovery was denied in both
the district and circuit courts.5" The taxpayer relied upon
the Indiana Supreme Court's invalidation of the gross in-
come tax when applied to Class A sales of the International
Harvester Company.54 Two 55 of the three judges sitting
in the Circuit Court of Appeals felt that the International
Harvester case was distinguishable in that the Class A sales
there were made and paid for outside the state whereas here
both acceptance and payment occurred within Indiana. The
remaining judge was unable to make this nice distinction.5"
52 323 U. S. 459 (1945).
53 Ford Motor Company v. Department of Treasury, 141 F. (2d) 24 (C. C. A.
7th, 1944).
54 Department of Treasury v. International Harvester Company, 221 Ind.
416, 47 N. E. (2d) 150 (1943).
55 Kerner and Minton, C. J. J.
56 Lindley, D. J.
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On the taxpayer's appeal, certiorari was granted,57 the
judgment below vacated, and the cause remanded to the dis-
trict court with directions to dismiss the complaint for want
of consent by the state to the suit.58 The state had provided
a means " whereby any aggrieved taxpayer could seek a re-
fund of gross income tax alleged to have been erroneously
collected by application to the Department of Taxation, and
upon its rejection of his claim bring suit therefor "in any
proper action or suit against the department in any court
of competent jurisdiction." The United States Supreme
Court held that the words "any court of competent jurisdic-
tion" were limited in meaning to "any state court of compe-
tent jurisdiction." " This action, brought in federal district
court, was held to institute a suit against the state in its sov-
ereign capacity to which the state had not consented. It
therefore followed that under the terms of the Eleventh
Amendment, the federal courts were without jurisdiction to
hear the action."'
As undiscouraged by these set-backs as King Robert the
Bruce's famous spider, an indefatigable taxpayer again com-
menced spinning his web about the Department of Taxation
by starting what was to be the twelfth suit to bring the con-
stitutionality of the Indiana gross income tax before the
United States Supreme Court. Profiting by the expensive
course in practice taught by the Supreme Court in the Ford
Motor case, an Indiana trustee of a testamentary trust set
up under the will of an Indiana decedent sued in the state
courts to recover sums paid out in gross income taxes. Free-
57 Ford Motor Company v. Department of Treasury, 322 U. S. 721 (1944).
58 Ford Motor Company v. Department of Treasury, 323 U. S. 459 (1945).
Accord: Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 327 U. S. 573 (1946).
59 Section 64-2614 (a), Burns Indiana Stat. Anno. (1943 Replacement).
60 Note 58, supra.
61 Section 64-2614 (a) was amended in 1945 to provide that an aggrieved
taxpayer may recover "any amount thus improperly collected, together with in-
terest thereon, in a civil action or suit against the department in the circuit or
superior court of the county of his residence or business location and if he has no
such residence or business location then in the Marion Circuit or Superior Court.
The state hereby consents to such suits in said courts and no others and said
courts are hereby granted exclusive jurisdiction of said suits."
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man, the trustee in question had, during 1940, effected some
twenty separate sales of trust assets consisting of corporate
stock and bonds. Orders to sell were placed by the trustee
with a local Richmond, Indiana, broker who effected the
sales through a New York brokerage house having member-
ship on the New York Stock Exchange. Upon being notified
that the sale had been consummated in New York, the trus-
tee would forward the securities to New York through his
local broker. Receipts from the sales less commissions and
selling expenses were transmitted to the trustee from New
York via his Richmond broker. It also appeared that all
persons purchasing the particular securities sold in the fash-
ion described above were non-residents of Indiana although
at the time of sale the identity of these purchasers was un-
known to the trustee.62
The application of the state gross income tax to the net
receipts accruing to the trust from these sales was held illegal
by the court of first instance.'8 On appeal by the Depart-
ment, the judgment below was reversed and the tax upheld.64
The theory behind the Indiana Supreme Court's reversal
may perhaps be best summed up in the phrase mobilia
sequuntwr personam which signifies that the situs of intan-
gibles such as corporate securities is governed by the owner's
domicile. The state of such situs, it was held, possesses the
power to tax such property even if multiple burdens result.65
On the taxpayer's appeal to the United States Supreme
Court, this decision was reversed.66 Although the Court would
62 An opinion of the Indiana Attorney General in July, 1946 (C. C. H. Ind.
C. T. P. 15-014) had attempted to limit the doctrine of the Adams case to cases
where goods were shipped to buyers outside of Indiana pursuant to prior orders.
In the absence of a buyer whose identity was known at the time of shipment
it was held that the constitutional immunity afforded by the Commerce Clause
was nonapplicable. The soundness of this ruling is highly questionable, in view
of Freeman v. Hezit, 329 U. S. 249 (1946), discussed infra.
63 Circuit Court, Wayne County, Hoelscher, J.
64 Hewit v. Freeman, 221 Ind. 675, 51 N. E. (2d) 6 (1943).
65 Ibid citing Curry v. McCandless, 307 U. S. 357, 123 A. L. R. 162 (1939)
and O'Kane v. State, 283 N. Y. 439, 28 N. E. (2d) 905 (1940). State Tax Com-
mission v. Aldrich. 316 U. S. 174 (1942) might have been cited as a more recent
and even more striking illustration of this point.
INDIANA GROSS INCOME TAX
have based its reversal on a simple re-affirmance of the
Adams case " as Mr. Justice Rutledge pointed out in his
concurring opinion, a majority of the Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, chose to base their decision
on broader grounds.
Although interstate commerce must admittedly pay its
way, a state may not place "what amounts to a levy upon
the very process of commerce across state lines." 68 A gross
income tax is a "direct imposition on that very freedom of
commercial flow which for more than a hundred and fifty
years has been the ward of the Commerce Clause." The tax
here in question being on "the very process" of interstate
commerce was declared invalid. The belief of the Indiana
Supreme Court that the interstate sale of intangibles was
subject to a gross income tax levied by the state of the
owner's domicile was brusquely brushed aside. "Latin
tags," the Court observed, "like mobilia sequuntur personam
often do service for legal analysis, but they ought not to con-
found constitutional issues." 69 Commerce is none the less
protected by the Constitution whether the subject of such
commerce be machines or "pieces of paper worth
$65,214.20." 70
Mr. Justice Rutledge's fear 7 that apportionment of a
state tax on interstate commerce so that only the local inci-
66 Freeman v. Hewit, 327 U. S. 249 (Dec. 16, 1946), rehearing denied, 320
U. S. 832 (Jan. 13, 1947).
67 J. D. Adams Mfg. Company v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307 (1938), discussed
supra.
68 Note 66 supra at p. 254.
69 Idem at p. 258.
70 Idem at p. 259. Cf. however Chief Justice Stone's dissent in Northwest
Airliner, Inc. v. Minnesota 322 U. S. 292, 311 (1944) where he states that "as this
Court has often pointed out, the taxation of chattels rests on a different basis
than does the taxation of intangibles," citing Union Transit Company v. Kenucky,
199 U. S. 194, 205-6 (1905), Schwab v. Richardson, 263 U. S. 88, 92 (1923)
Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473, 494 (1925); Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U.
S. 1, 16-18 (1928); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U. S. 193, 209-10 (1936);
Curry v. McCandless, 307 U. S. 357, 363-6 (1939); Graves v. Elliott, 307 U. S.
383 (1939); Graves v. Schmidlapp, 315 U. S. 657 (1942); State Tax Commission
v. Aldrich, 316 U. S. 174 (1942). Cf. however, Bittker, The Taxation of Out-of-
State Tangible Property (1947) 56 YATz L. 3. 640.
71 Note 66, at pp. 259-263.
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dents of such commerce were subjected to tax would no long-
er serve to save a state import if "direct," would seem to have
been without substantial foundation. Less than a month
after it decision in the Freeman case the Supreme Court
upheld 72 an Ohio state franchise tax based on the privilege
of doing business within the state. A formula for apportion-
ment was provided in the act whereby one-half of the tax-
payer's total capital is multiplied by the value of all of the
taxpayer's Ohio property over the total value of its property
wherever owned. The other half of the taxpayer's total cap-
ital is multiplied by the total value of the taxpayer's business
done in the State over the total country-wide business. Ad-
dition of the two products gives the tax basis which when
multiplied by the tax rate, 1/10th of 1%, yields the total
franchise tax payable.
The use of this means of apportionment was upheld even
though the receipts of interstate sales were admittedly in-
cluded in the computation, i. e., goods produced in Ohio but
sold to customers outside the state. Any legitimate and bona
fide effort on the part of the state fairly to apportion a tax
burden between local and interstate commerce, it was indi.
cated, would be upheld.78
Despite the limitations of the Harvester case and the need
to take Mr. Justice Rutledge's alarmist view of the effect of
the Court's opinion in the Freeman case with caution, it
must be admitted that the United States Supreme Court's
views of the extent to which interstate commerce may be
subjected to state and local taxation appears to have been
altered considerably this term. Although the Indiana State
Treasurer has announced an administrative policy of limit-
72 International Harvester Company v. Evatt, Tax Commissioner of Ohio,
329 U. S. 416 (Jan. 6, 1947), rehearing denied 329 U. S. 834 (Feb. 3, 1947).
73 "Unless a palpably disproportionate result comes from an apportionment,
a result which makes it patent that the tax is levied upon interstate commerce
rather than upon an intrastate privilege, this Court has not been willing to nullify
honest state efforts to make apportionments." Note 72, pp. 422-423.
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ing the Freeman case to its own particular facts,74 there is
little reason to believe that this policy will be sustained if
challenged in the courts.
For example, it is understood that the state tax authorities
are currently proceeding on the assumption that the net pro-
ceeds from the sale of securities in interstate commerce are
exempt from the Indiana gross income tax only where the
buyer is a non-resident of Indiana. This limitation is of du-
bious validity. In the Freeman case even though the sale
on the New York Stock Exchange had been made to a non-
resident of Indiana, the shares actually delivered to the
buyer in fulfillment of the sales contract were not necessar-
fly those constituting a portion of the corpus of the trust of
which Mr. Freeman was trustee. Under the rules of the
Exchange delivery is usually due on the second full business
day following day of the contract, 75 and the shares in the
Freeman case were not even forwarded to New York until
after the sale had been effected. The person who actually
received the shares once owned by the trust of which Free-
man was trustee thus may have been some one quite differ-
ent from the person whose money was turned over to the
trustee.
The present view of the Supreme Court 76 clearly reflects
a reversal of its former trend and a reversion to an older line
74 "Officials of the Gross Income Tax Division advise that the recent decision
of the United States Supreme Court in the Freeman case, relating to the taxability
of gross receipts from the sale of securities, is confined to a special and specific
set of facts; and therefore, that the decision does not apply to all types of sales
of securities." Info. Bull. of Gross Income Tax Division, Jan. 1947, C. C. H. Ind.
C. T. P. 15-017.
75 Rules of the Board of Governors for the Settlement of Exchange Con-
tracts. A variety of dates govern special types of settlement, i. e. "Cash" (Rule
162); "Sellers' Option" (Rule 164 (a)); "Regular Way Delayed Delivery"
Rule 164 (b)). The most common or so-called "Regular Way" calls for delivery on
the third full business day following the day of contract (Rules 109 (b), 112 (b)).
76 See especially Rutledge's concurrence in Freeman v. Hewit, supra, and his
joint dissent with Douglas in Lazarus Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Com-
pany et. al., 330 U. S. 422, 444 (March 10, 1947) where he states "The failure of
the Court to adhere to the philosophy of our recent cases corroborates the impres-
sion which some of us had that Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, marked the end
of one cycle under the Commerce Clause and the beginning of another."
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of judicial authority once believed to be overruled.77 It now
appears that the rumored demise of this older line of cases
striking down unapportioned state gross receipts taxes levied
on interstate communications and transportation such as ra-
dio stations, telephones, telegraphs, railroads and stevedoring
companies 78 has been greatly exaggerated.
Subsequent to both the Freeman and International Har-
vester cases the United States Supreme Court 79 has affirmed
the invalidation 80 of an unapportioned privilege tax levied
by New York City 81 on the gross receipts of two stevedoring
companies. The basis for decision rests on the proposition
that stevedoring is essential to and indistinguishable from
transportation which constitutes interstate commerce upon
which a direct tax burden may not be laid either by the
several states or by any political subdivision thereof.8 2
In addition to its renewed interest in invalidating state
burdens on interstate commerce, the Supreme Court since
the commencement of the October Term, 1946, has evinced
new interest in striking down state tax burdens on foreign
commerce. Once an article of trade has entered into the
stream of foreign commerce both the federal government 8
77 "The Beruind-White decision in effect overruled the long-standing formal
dogma that a state may not impose a tax directly on interstate i6ommerce." Lock-
hart, Gross Receipts Taxes on Interstate Transportation and Communication
(1943), 57 Harv. L. Rev. 40, 87.
78 For a collection of these older cases see Dunham, Gross Receipts Taxes
on Interstate Transactions (1947), 47 Col. L. Rev. 211, 222.
79 Lazarus Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Company et. al., 330 U.
S. 422 (March 10, 1947).
80 In the Matter of Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Company v. McGoldrick,
and in the Matter of John T. Clark & Son v. McGoldrick, 269 A. D. 685, 54 N.
Y. S. (2d) 380, 383 (A. D., 1st Dept., 1945); determination of the Comptroller
unanimously annulled on the authority of Puget Sound Company v. Tax Com-
mission, 302 U. S. 90 (1937), aff'd 294 N. Y. 906, 908, 63 N. E. (2d) 112 (1945).
81 A tax of 1/10 of 1% is levied by the City of New York upon "the
privilege of carrying on or exercising for gain or profit within the city any trade,
business, profession, vocation or commercial activity other than a financial busi-
ness, . . ." § R41-2.0(a). Local Laws of the City of New York (1940) No. 78.
82 Reaffirming Puget Sound Stevedoring Company v. State Tax Commission,
302 U. S. 90 (1937).
83 Article 1, § 9, Clause 5 of the United States Constitution.
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and the several states 8" are forbidden to levy export duties
thereon.
In a recent case 85 the Supreme Court held a California
sales tax violative of this constitutional prohibition when
levied on the sale of oil to the New Zealand Admiralty.
There the oil, extracted from the earth, processed and stored
within the state, was both appropriated to the sales contract
and inextricably started on its journey in foreign commerce
by one and the same act, i. e., delivery on board a New
Zealand naval tanker moored next to petitioner's oil storage
tanks in a California harbor. A tax on the proceeds of such
a sale was held to constitute a tax on exports, and hence an
illegal exaction.86
The Court's reawakened interest in the constitutional pro-
hibition against the levying of export duties " may also be
traced in the Lazarus Joseph case. There Mr. Justices
Douglas and Rutledge dissented in so far as the city tax was
levied on gross receipts derived from handling goods in inter-
state commerce on the ground that the tax was non-discrimi-
natory and of such a nature as to afford no possibility of
being levied again by some other state or political subdivi-
sion. Both justices conceded, however, that the tax was
void in so far as it attempted to subject receipts derived by
the same companies from the handling of cargo destined for
a foreign port to a tax burden.88
84 Article 1, § 10, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution.
85 Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board of Equalization, 329 U. S. 69 (Nov.
25, 1946).
86 Idem. Cf. however, Independent Warehouse v. Scheele, 331 U. S. 70 (1947).
87 This interest is not limited to export duties but also extends to efforts
of the states to tax imports. See Hooven & Allison C~nnpany v. Evatt, Tax Com-
missioner of Ohio, 324 U. S. 652 (1945).
88 Of the nine Supreme Court Justices only Black and Murphy seem to
hold a different view on this point. Even Mr. Justice Black, however, failed to
dissent in Puget Sound Stevedoring Company v. State. Tax Commission, supra.
Could his silence have been due to stage fright? The case was argued only nme
days after he first took his seat on the supreme bench and was decided less than a
month after argument.
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In light of the present trend of the United States Supreme
Court with regard to the validity of direct state taxation of
interstate commerce in the form of a gross receipts or gross
income tax, it may well be doubted that the efforts of the
Indiana tax authorities to limit Freeman v. Hewit to its own
facts will prove successful. The holding in the Adams case
upon which some doubt had been cast,89 has been reaffirmed,
perhaps even gone beyond. The freeing of the Indiana
broker from liability for state gross income tax on his com-
missions derived from interstate sales of securities can no
longer be doubted? Brokers, dealers in securities, trans-
portation and communication companies rendering services
in connection with interstate commerce should all re-examine
their liability for this tax in light of the United States Su-
preme Court's present attitude toward this direct imposition
upon the proceeds of such interstate commerce. Indiana
companies and dealers exporting goods to foreign countries
should be particularly alert to the full implications of the
Richfield Oil and Lazarus Joseph cases. Passage of title
to goods on delivery to a carrier where such goods are des-
tined for foreign countries would appear to be sufficient 91
to bring an Indiana manufacturer or processer within the
protection of this new line of authority.
Early comments upon the Supreme Court's decision in the
Freeman case serve strongly to emphasize a current social
phenomenon. For two thousand years the name of the pub-
lican, or tax gatherer, was constantly linked with that of
the sinner, the Pharisee and the whited sepulcher. Heroic
89 Cf. Mr. Justice Rutledge's concurrence in the Freeman case. See also:
Dunham, Gross Receipts Taxes on Interstate Transactions (1947), 47 CoL. L. REv.
211.
90 See dissent of Douglas and Murphy in the Freeman case: "I think the
Court confuses a gross receipts tax on the Indiana broker with a gross receipts
tax on his Indiana customer. Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305
U. S. 434, would hold invalid a gross receipts tax, unapportioned, on the broker."
329 U. S. 249, 283-4. The State Gross Income Tax Regulations seem to provide
for no apportionment whatever in this regard. See Regs. 2700, 2701, 2704, 2800.
91 Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board of Equalization, note 85, supra; Spald-
ing & Bros. v. Edwards, 262 U. S. 66, 69-70 (1923).
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resistance to the tax collectors made national heroes of
Hampdem, Pym and Strode in Stuart times. Today, how-
ever, by the simple process of first doubling, then tripling
and finally quadrupling the citizen's tax burden, the once
despised publican has metamorphosed himself into a "fiscal
statesman" referred to in hushed tones as "The Commis-
sioner."
This process has gone so far that the freeing of the testi-
mentary trust, created by the Will of the late Henry C.
Starr, 2 from liability for gross income tax on the capital
gains realized by the trust in 1940 through the sale of cor-
porate securities on the New York Stock Exchange has been
interpreted by an Indiana* law school professor 9 as direct
evidence of the existence of a policy of severity toward In-
diana on the part of the Lord.94 If the tax gatherers have
in fact been driven from a tiny corner of the fiscal field,
without desiring to probe too deeply into "the adjudicative
womb of the future" " it may be hazarded that enterprising
Indiana counsel will not stand bemused like sun-struck
Joshuas but will make full use of "The Commissioner's"
temporary discomfiture no matter how juristic augurs inter-
pret the celestial omens.
Robert T. Molloy.
92 Mr. Freeman s testator, see Hewit v. Freeman, 221 Ind. 675, 51 N. E. (2d)
6 (1943).
93 Allison, Dunham, author of Gross Receipts Taxes on Interstate Transac-
tions (1947), 47 Cor. L. REV. 211, was an assistant professor of law at Indiana
University when his article appeared. His indignant protests against the escape
of the Starr trust from taxation is forcibly reminiscent of the cry "Less Bread!
More Taxes I" raised by Lewis Carroll's bemused mob in Sylvie and Bruno.
94 The sub-title of Professor Dunham's article is "(Ain't God Tough on
Indiana)."
25 The phrase is that of Thomas Reed Powell, note, Sales and Use Taxes:
Collection from Absentee Vendors (1944), 57 HtAv. L. RPv. 1086, at 1092. This
dean of American constitutional law commentators through long experience with
the vagaries of the Supreme Court has adopted a wait-and-see attitude with regard
to the future significance of the cases dealt with above. See Powell, More Ado
About Gross Receipts Taxes (1947), 60 HAsv. L. Rav. 532, 710. For a less
penetrating analysis see also Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power-
Revised Version (1947), 47 Cor. L. REv. 558. Certiorari has already been granted
in Memphis Natural Gas Company v. Stone on petition by the taxpayer against
a Mississippi tax on its interstate natural gas pipe line running through the state.
